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Evolution of US Ballistic Missile Defense System Development Origins of US Ballistic Missile Defense
The US has been developing missile defense systems since the Nazi's first used ballistic missiles militarily in World War II. BMD programs received varying degrees of priority and fiscal support, depending on technological developments of threat countries, international treaty agreements, and US national security policy. Due to its very naturecutting edge technologically, extraordinarily expensive, and strategically and politically charged-BMD has always been rather controversial. Accordingly, DoD has treated BMD programs very differently over time, ranging from single Service managed programs to centrally managed DoD level programs rivaling the Manhattan Project in complexity, expense, and national priority. The brief BMD development history below provides a backdrop to place the status of current missile development efforts, including Element transition and transfer status, into context.
US BMD technology research and development (R&D) programs have existed
since shortly after the first German V-2 missile struck London on September 8, 1944. 2 Although inaccurate with a relatively small warhead, the V-2 was an effective terror weapon against populated areas, causing mass panic and chaos, and a sense of helplessness and vulnerability, since there was no defense. The Germans launched more than 3000 V-2s during World War II against Allied targets in Britain, Belgium, France, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands, killing an estimated 7,250 military and civilian personnel. 3 The US learned after the war that the Nazis had also completed fabrication of a container to transport V-2s across the Atlantic, towed by snorkel-equipped U-Boats, within striking distance of cities along the US east coast. Germany was also developing a Council also issued a position paper on continental defense that called for -an antiIntercontinental Ballistic Missile weapons system as a matter of the highest national priority.‖ 6 With the Soviets escalating the space race and the US responding with an increase in national priority of missile defense capability, development gained even more momentum.
Early Ballistic Missile Defense Capability Demonstrations and Deployments
In 1961, the Soviets conducted the first intercept and destruction of a missile warhead using a fragmentation warhead at an altitude of 25 kilometers. 7 In 1962, the a Soviet strike could easily overwhelm it, and the detonation of its own nuclear-armed warheads would likely blind its ground radar. 8 During the same period, the Soviets deployed a similar nuclear-armed system to defend Moscow, the ABM-3. In the 1990s, the Soviets upgraded it to the A-135, which remains operational today, with a reported 100 interceptors, in compliance with the ABM treaty. 9 The 1976 inactivation of the Grand Forks Safeguard site left the US without any BMD capability against a quickly growing (in quantity and sophistication) Soviet and Chinese threat. The 1980 election of President Ronald Reagan, known as a strategic thinker and visionary, again boosted the priority of missile defense with a dramatic shift in the US nuclear deterrence policy. The special nature of missile defense development, operations, and support calls for non-standard approaches to both acquisition and requirements generation. As a development activity, the MDA will require some expanded responsibility and authority. I therefore direct the following: to rapidly carry out my direction, streamlined executive oversight and reporting will be implemented … Additionally, to affirm my commitment to rapidly capitalize on promising concepts and promptly adjust program priorities, I request the Deputy Secretary of Defense to ensure that decision-making cycle times are as rapid as possible…I will support additional or revised statutory authority … to reduce development time and enhance program success. (Secretary of Defense Memo, 2 Jan 02) 19 The most significant organizational and process changes included: 
"Star Wars" Era

Development of Overarching Memorandum of Agreements and Element Annexes
With Once … approved by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the physical accountability and control of missile defense units, operations and support, and infrastructure responsibilities transfer to the lead Service. Research, development, manufacturing, and testing activities remain the responsibility of MDA after a BMDS element capability has been transferred to a lead Service. Accordingly, -hybrid‖ program offices, consisting of organizations reporting to either MDA or the lead Services will be formed to execute this division of responsibilities. 
Assessment of the Current Ballistic Missile Defense System Transition and Transfer Process and Philosophy
As with any large, complex, bureaucratic organization, significant changes within 
Assessment of LCMP and Transition and Transfer Business Rules Implementation
The LCMP, as envisioned by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, appears to be 
Assessment of Acquisition Oversight Improvement
One of the primary criticisms of MDA by Congress and the Army has been the perceived lack of acquisition process oversight since MDA was exempted from the traditional JCIDS requirements process and the DoD milestone-based acquisition process.
MDA instead developed and uses a capability-based acquisition process. However, after . 39 Element status varies and is discussed in the following summaries below.
Terminal High Altitude Area Defense Subsystem
The THAAD element is a globally transportable, rapidly deployable capability to intercept and destroy short or medium range ballistic missiles both inside (endo- transfer to the Army. 41 The annex is in final staffing, to be followed by Army/MDA Board of Director's approval.
Army/Navy/Transportable Radar Surveillance Subsystem
The AN/TPY-2 is globally transportable, rapidly deployable X-band high resolution phased array radar designed specifically for ballistic missile defense. It is capable of acquiring, tracking, discriminating, classifying, identifying, and estimating the trajectory parameters of all classes of threat missiles and missile components and transmits the data to other missile defense elements or the THAAD weapon system.
MDA is continuing incremental development activities to improve its capability. Six 
Ground-Based Midcourse Defense Subsystem
The mission of the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) element of the BMDS is to defend the US, our deployed military forces, and friends and allies against a 
Phased Array Tracking Radar Intercept on Target Advanced Capability-3 Subsystem
The PATRIOT PAC-3 is a globally transportable, rapidly deployable system that provides simultaneous air and missile defense capabilities as the Lower Tier element in defense of US deployed forces and allies, providing an integrated, overlapping defense with the THAAD system against missile threats in the terminal phase of flight. It is the most mature hit-to-kill weapon system of the missile defense system. Although However, since PATRIOT had been developed by the Army using the traditional acquisition process, it was easily transferred back to the Army in 2003 by joint agreement, the details contained in a joint memorandum. 45 The Army is responsible for production and further upgrades of the PAC-3. MDA remains responsible for PAC-3 configuration management, sustaining engineering, and overall integrations of PAC-3 with the BMDS architecture. As agreed to in the MDA/Army overarching MOA, the previous agreement will be updated and revised to reflect current status.
